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Economic consequences of zero international migration in the EU - An assessment for Europe based on the 
Eurostat population projections 
 
Without international migration the EU28 population by 2060 would be reduced by 76 million people, with a higher median 
age. This study explores how much EU28 and members states long-term economic growth would be affected in case there 
would not be international migration to the EU28 countries from now to the year 2060. 
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Executive summary 
Purpose and policy context 
The EU ageing society constitutes a formidable policy challenge for years to come. International 
migration, also a hot current policy issue, can partly mitigate that trend. 
Let imagine that the EU would not receive any international migrant from today up to the year 
2060, a kind of zero migration case, what would that mean for the EU economy?  
 Would the EU experience a significant GDP loss?  
 Would EU long-term economic growth prospects be largely affected?  
 What would happen to the EU GDP per capita?  
 What would be those implications for the EU member states?  
 Would all of them be equally affected? 
Those are the issues this study intends to address.  
The analysis has indeed been motivated by the fact that international migration is a key implicit 
component of long-term demographic projections (Figure A). Eurostat foresees an average yearly 
net migration flow to the EU of around one million. It can be estimated that without extra-EU 
migration the population of the EU28 in 2060 would be 75 million lower than with migration, i.e. a 
14% population reduction; the working age population would be 20% lower. 
Figure A: Population pyramid in 2013 and in 2060 under the "Main scenario" (with migration) and "No 
migration" case 
Methodology 
In this study, an economic growth model is used to explore how EU long-term economic growth 
would be affected in a no-migration scenario. The model is estimated using a large set of public 
data covering more than 160 countries across almost five decades. It considers both the 
immediate effects due to the reduced labour supply and the dynamic effects via lower capital 
accumulation, as well as the change of both savings decisions and productivity levels. 
 3 
Main findings 
Without international migration: 
 The 2060 EU production or output (real GDP) would be 23% lower (Italy -33%, Spain -28%, 
UK -19%, Germany -35%, France -18%), compared to the projection with migration. 
 In 2060 there could be an estimated output loss of almost 7 trillion US$, compared to the 
scenario with migration (Figure B).  
 The cumulative output loss for the entire projection period would be around 47 trillion US$ 
(discounted at a 3% rate). 
 That would mean losing almost twenty years of economic growth: the 2043 EU output which 
could be reached with migration would be only attained without migration in 2060.  
 The annual EU growth rate would fall over the long term (for the 2013-2060 period) from 1.5% 
to less than 1.0%.  
 In 2060 the EU output per capita with migration flows would be around 57,000 US$, but it 
would fall to around 51,000 US$ without migration (around 10%). Most of the EU population 
would be worse off. 
Key conclusions 
Migration can be largely beneficial for EU long-term economic growth: it increases labour supply, 
favours capital accumulation and it has an overall positive effect on savings rate and productivity 
levels as it reduces the EU population ageing. This analysis can be relevant for the on-going EU 
debate regarding migration policy. 
Figure B: GDP and GDP per capita projections 
 
 
Main scenario
No migration
10
15
20
25
30
1990 2060
GDP
0
2
4
6
8
2010 2060
GDP loss without migration
c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
5
 U
S
$
 (
tr
ill
.)
Year
Main scenario
No migration
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1990 2060
GDP per capita
0
2000
4000
6000
2010 2060
GDP per capita loss without migration
G
D
P
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
2
0
0
5
 U
S
$
Year
 4 
1 Introduction 
The study of the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the environment is one 
of the main policy support activities of the Joint Research Center, using quantative tools like the 
global energy model POLES or the GEM-E3 economic multi-sector model. The analysis of climate 
change actually requires a long-term framework where demography is a key driver. Demographic 
trends directly affect the long-term evolution of the economic system, with effects on the energy 
system and the environment. This article focuses on the relationship between demographics 
(migration) and economic growth. 
Since the 1990s, net migration in Europe has played a prominent role as a driver of EU population 
change and nowadays explains most (i.e. up to 80% in the last few years) of the overall EU 
population growth. Statistics also support the evidence that migration counteracts population 
ageing in Europe, due to increasing life expectancy and decreasing fertility rates, and for both 
reasons might have profound impacts on the overall economic performance in EU Member States. 
An ageing population impacts negatively on growth, via savings, productivity, consumption, 
taxation, and pensions. 
An interesting overview of the socioeconomic implications of population ageing is given in Harper 
(2014). Existing literature on this topic provides indications of the effects of migration and ageing 
on the economic activity (GDP), comparing the adverse vs. positive consequences. For instance, in 
a recent paper Sanchez-Martinez et al. use a coupled overlapping generation and computable 
general equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of the UK to quantify the long-term growth impacts of 
migration. The authors explore the implications of a case in which net migration to the UK would 
be reduced by a factor of two, in line with the policy proposal of the Conservative Party. They find 
that by 2060 GDP and GDP per capita would fall by 11% and 2.7%, respectively, compared to the 
baseline (Sanchez-Martinez et al., 2013). Holtz-Eakin comes to similar conclusions for the US, 
when he quantifies the economic benefits of the immigration reforms proposed in 2013 to the US 
Congress (increasing immigration to the US). The author finds that in the near term the reform 
would raise the GDP growth rate by 0.9 percentage points, increase GDP per capita and reduce the 
cumulative federal deficit (Holtz-Eakin, 2013). Fehr et al. analyse to what extent migration can be 
seen as a solution to the adverse economic effects of demographic transition in developed 
countries. Using a three-region (US, Europe and Japan) dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle 
model, the authors find that the positive effects of migration due to an increase of labour supply 
and faster capital accumulation are offset by a decline in real wages and an increase of the demand 
for public goods and government welfare (Fehr et al., 2004). 
Migration in the EU Member States has also become an urgent humanitarian issue because of e.g. 
the war in Syria and the overall extremely fragile socioeconomic condition in the Middle East which 
have led to a large increase in the number of refugees to Europe. More recently, Kancs and Lecca 
used the European Commission’s RHOMOLO CGE regional model to assess the macroeconomic 
implications of different scenarios of refugees’ integration in Europe. The authors find that the 
initial pressure on public finances due to the costs of integration is offset in the medium-long term 
by the associated socioeconomic and fiscal benefits (Kancs and Lecca, 2016).  
Regarding the effects of population ageing, Lindh and Malmberg studied how and to what extent 
the demographic age structure affects the long-term GDP growth rates in the OECD countries. The 
authors apply an augmented neoclassical growth model to OECD data from 1950 to 1990 and 
confirm the micro-economic evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between age and growth 
rates of GDP per worker, with the largest positive contribution at the middle-age cohort (Lindh and 
Malmberg, 1999). Skirbekk conducts a literature survey and concludes that individual productivity 
starts to decrease from 50 years of age (Skirbekk, 2004). However, Acemoglu and Restrepo arrive 
at different conclusions. These authors conduct a panel data analysis for 169 countries in the 1990-
2015 period and find no evidence of an inverse relationship between ageing and economic growth. 
Acemoglu and Restrepo emphasize the evidence that countries undergoing fast ageing have also 
adopted more robots, which might explain the absence of such an inverse relationship (Acemoglu 
and Restrepo, 2017).  
The objective of this study is to explore the economic consequences of a hypothetical scenario in 
which there would not be migration from now to the year 2060. Effects like the implications in 
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terms of economic growth (GDP) can be significant if the scale of the migration assumption in the 
population projections is large. The perspective of the analysis is long-term, so for instance 
refugees problems are not dealt with. 
In that respect, Eurostat has recently published demographic projections (Eurostat, 2017) that 
include a sensitivity case where net migration flows towards the individual EU countries until the 
year 2080 are set to zero. From these projections, it can be estimated that without migration the 
EU population would be substantially reduced in the 2015-2060 time horizon: by 14% in 2060. 
The MaGE econometric growth model is used to ascertain the role of migratory flows in the long 
term evolution of economic growth. Changes in migration would modify the labour supply of the 
economy and the age structure of the population. The model analyses how those changes would 
affect economic growth, considering also the effects on savings and domestic investments. 
Section 2 presents the demographic projections used in this paper. Section 3 explains the 
economic growth model. Results are discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Eurostat population scenarios 
Two demographic scenarios are considered in this study: "Main scenario" and "No migration". The 
"Main scenario" includes both resident population and population with foreign background, i.e. 
migrants and their descendants, and maintains the recent developments in population trends 
(business as usual). On the contrary, the "No migration" scenario includes only resident population 
and population with a EU background, but does not include the stock of population with extra-EU 
background. More information on how the scenarios are constructed is given in the appendix. 
2.1 Population and working age projections 
Table 1 shows the projections of the population and working age population under the two 
scenarios ("Main scenario" and "No migration") for each of the EU countries and the EU as a whole. 
In 2013, the total EU population was 505 million. In 2060 it is projected to be around 525 million 
under the "Main scenario", i.e. roughly a 4% increase compared to the 2013 figures, and around 
450 million under the "No migration", i.e. 14% lower than in the "Main scenario". Inward 
international migration to Europe is therefore expected to contribute substantially to the overall EU 
population by 2060.  
Yet the EU aggregate figures hide large variability across EU Member States. For the largest 
population countries, compared to the 2013 population, the "Main Scenario" assumes a strong 
population growth in UK (24%) and France (15%), and a lower increase in Spain (6%). Germany is 
assumed to have a stable population pathway, while Poland could lose 14% of its population and 
Italy 5%.  
When the stock of extra-EU migrants is subtracted from the "Main scenario", all big countries, with 
the exception of Poland (for which almost no immigration is projected) would experience large 
population reductions, relative to the 'Main scenario' in 2060: 18% for Spain, 14% for France, 11% 
for UK, 22% for Italy and 23% for Germany. 
The working age population, i.e. the population comprised between 15 and 64 years old, is 
projected to decrease by 12% in the "Main scenario" and by 29% in the "No migration", compared 
to 2013. The "No migration" scenario would mean a 20% reduction when compared to the "Main 
scenario", for the year 2060.  
Again the member states would see relatively larger changes in the working age distribution: 25% 
for Spain, 15% for UK, 17% for France, 31% for Italy and 32% for Germany. 
2.2 Population projections and age distribution 
The change in the overall population is not the only difference between the two scenarios; in fact, 
according to the Eurostat projections, the ageing of the population would accelerate without 
migration.   
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Figure 1 shows the population pyramid, with the age distribution of the population in 2013, in blue 
line, and in 2060 under the two scenarios, blue area for the "Main scenario" and darker blue area 
for the "No migration". In both scenarios the population over 80 is projected to increase 
substantially relative to 2013. The share of the migration in the total population grows with the 
younger cohorts.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the population and the dependency ratio (defined as the ratio 
between non active, i.e. too old or too young to work, and the active population between 15 and 
64 years old). The ratio rises substantially: from a value of around 50 by the befinning of the XXI 
century to close to 80 in the "Main Scenario" and to around 90 in the "No migration" case. Ageing 
of the population is confirmed by the gradual increase of the median age of the population. In 
2013 median age of EU28 population is registered to be 41 for males and 43 for females. In 2060 
median age is expected to increase to 48 and 45 for females and males, respectively, in the "Main 
scenario", and to 51 and 47 in the "No migration". 
Table 1: EU countries population and working age population projections for 2060 under the "Main scenario" 
and the "No migration" scenarios. 
 
  
Austria 8,452 10,231 7,877 5,705 5,838 4,036
Belgium 11,162 13,581 11,988 7,304 7,946 6,702
Bulgaria 7,285 5,226 5,001 4,899 2,755 2,583
Croatia 4,262 3,534 3,428 2,852 1,999 1,921
Cyprus 866 1,012 907 610 577 492
Czech Republic 10,516 10,308 9,250 7,188 5,603 4,721
Denmark 5,603 6,756 5,793 3,625 3,956 3,207
Estonia 1,320 1,221 601 875 666 249
Finland 5,427 5,655 5,152 3,517 3,218 2,810
France 65,600 75,525 64,848 41,883 43,646 36,190
Germany 80,524 80,832 62,565 53,126 44,960 30,657
Greece 11,004 8,295 6,179 7,180 4,365 2,835
Hungary 9,909 9,120 8,870 6,776 5,077 4,870
Ireland 4,591 5,898 5,414 3,024 3,352 2,935
Italy 59,685 56,949 44,670 38,697 31,046 21,566
Latvia 2,024 1,427 606 1,352 721 246
Lithuania 2,972 1,838 1,791 1,993 943 914
Luxembourg 537 993 850 371 585 475
Malta 421 519 435 288 288 220
Netherlands 16,780 19,323 17,876 11,077 11,333 10,160
Poland 38,063 32,848 32,218 26,843 17,269 16,719
Portugal 10,487 8,552 7,573 6,904 4,602 3,763
Romania 20,020 15,699 15,487 13,622 8,489 8,306
Slovak Republic 5,411 5,115 5,063 3,870 2,755 2,713
Slovenia 2,059 2,000 1,667 1,409 1,097 831
Spain 46,728 49,557 40,855 31,376 27,170 20,379
Sweden 9,556 13,285 11,518 6,116 7,682 6,325
United Kingdom 63,905 79,339 70,778 41,658 46,390 39,436
EU28 505,167 524,636 449,264 334,142 294,331 236,261
Total population (thousands) Active population aged 15 to 64 (thousands)
2013
2060 (Main 
scenario)
2060 (No 
migration)
2013
2060 (Main 
scenario)
2060 (No 
migration)
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Figure 1: Population age distribution in 2013 (blue line) and in 2060 under the “Main scenario”(light blue 
area) and "No migration" scenarios (dark blue area) 
 
Figure 2: Population and dependency ratio projections for EU in the "No migration" (dotted lines) and the 
"Main scenario" (solid lines) 
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3 Methodology 
The economic impact of migration is quantified with the growth model MaGE, which is an 
econometric long term growth model for the world economy, estimated with data from the World 
Bank and the United Nations (Fouré et al., 2013). The model explicitly considers both the impact of 
migration on labour supply and on the age structure of the population affecting savings and 
domestic investments (see Annex 2 for a detailed description of the model equations). 
The model captures the effects of migration on long term economic growth via four transmission 
mechanisms. Figure 3 represents them in a schematic way (the numbers next to the arrows 
indicate the transmission mechanisms). 
1. Labour: migration impacts on the overall working age population and the labour supply and, 
therefore, output; 
2. Capital: a gradually shrinking output lowers investments, which reduces the capital stock, 
decreasing output in the subsequent period; 
3. Savings: a change of the age structure affects the saving rates and therefore investments.  
4. Productivity: a change of the age structure and of the proportion of unskilled population 
affects productivity. 
It is interesting to note the dynamic nature of the model induced mainly by the process of capital 
accumulation. The Capital mechanism introduces significant feedback effects on the overall output 
growth. The capital stock of the current year is equal to the stock of the previous year minus the 
depreciated stock plus investments. As investment is computed as a fraction of total output, a 
lower output due to lower Labour availability leads to a proportionate reduction in investment, then 
to a reduction of the capital stock and in turn to a lower output in the next period. Moreover, the 
fraction of the output that corresponds to investment, i.e. the investment rate, is calculated as a 
function of savings, which shrink due to the ageing population and exacerbates the overall effect 
on the capital stock and on the total output.  
The four transmission mechanisms described in this section are assessed in order to have a 
decomposition of the overall effect of total output.  
Figure 3: schematic description of the modelling framework 
 
It is assumed that the participation rates to the labour market are the same both in the "Main 
scenario" and in the "No migration". Moreover, there are two other key assumptions in the model: 
firstly, retirement age is at 65 for all countries; secondly, in absence of origin/destination 
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information about the migration flows, the skill structure of migrants is assumed to be the one of 
the resident population. One scenario will explore the signficance of this assumption. 
Economic output or GDP is considered as potential output, that is, without the influence of the 
business cycle. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Definition of scenarios 
The growth model described in the previous sections is used to quantify the impact on total output 
and output per capita, both at country level and for the EU as a whole, in the "Main scenario" and 
in a set of four cases for the "No migration" scenario plus one sensitivity case for the "Main 
scenario". 
Without migration there would be a general reduction in EU output, similar in scale to the reduction 
in working age population. The overall output reduction can be decomposed into different 
components, corresponding to the four macroeconomic transmission mechanisms discussed in the 
previous section, i.e. labour supply, capital accumulation, savings and productivity. Therefore, in 
order to quantify the contribution of each of these components, the output projections 
corresponding to the "Main Scenario" are compared to those obtained with the population 
projections of the "No migration" in a set of four different configurations of the model, where the 
macroeconomic transmission mechanisms are added one by one. 
1. "Labour": only labour supply is changed;  
2. "Capital": the effect on capital accumulation is added; 
3. "Savings": the effect of age structure on savings rates is added; 
4. "Productivity": the effect of ageing and proportion of unskilled population on productivity 
growth are added; 
The output projections for these four cases are cumulative. For instance, those obtained in the 
case "Capital" include both the effects of labour supply shortage and capital accumulation; the case 
"Savings" includes the effects of the two previous ones and so on. 
An additional scenario is also added in order to test the sensitivity of the model to one of the basic 
assumptions regarding the skill structure of the migrants. In the "Main scenario" both nationals and 
non-nationals are assumed to have the same skill structure and therefore to contribute equally to 
the deployment of capital and labour productivity. In the "Main scenario (unskilled) " case it is 
assumed that all migrants and the population stock of non-nationals are unskilled and thus reduces 
the productivity growth rate. 
4.2 GDP results 
Table 2 presents the GDP values for the reference year and the "Main scenario", with the changes 
in the GDP of the mentioned cases with respect to the "Main scenario" (i.e., "Main scenario 
(unskilled) ", "Labour", "Capital", "Savings", "Productivity"). The EU GDP would fall by 23% without 
migration (the "Productivity" case). The "Main scenario" with unskilled migrants would reduce GDP 
by 3%, not a big difference. 
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Table 2: EU and country total output projections for 2060 under the "Main scenario", "Main scenario 
(unskilled)", "Labour", "Capital", "Savings", "Productivity" 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the time path of the EU GDP and output loss projections for the "Main scenario" 
and the "No migration". The output loss is estimated to amount to be around 7 trillion US$ by 
2060. The cumulative output loss for the entire projection period would be 47 trillion US$, once 
discounted at a 3% rate. The annual economic growth rate for the whole period would fall from 
1.5% to less than 1%. Moreover, the 2043 EU total output that could be reached with migration 
would be only attained in 2060 without migration; that would mean losing almost 20 years of 
economic growth. The GDP losses in Table 2 (referring to the year 2060) are the result of the 
direct effect of that year and the indirect dynamic effects of the previous years. The indirect are 
induced by the dynamic nature of the economic system, which is captured in the model with the 
recursive interaction between some of the variables, e.g. investments and capital, investments and 
savings and investments and GDP. 
Austria 343 765 -5 -24 -28 -29 -35
Belgium 416 1,007 -7 -13 -15 -16 -20
Bulgaria 34 61 0 -5 -6 -6 -6
Croatia 44 220 -1 -3 -4 -4 -4
Cyprus 15 24 -2 -10 -12 -12 -20
Czech Republic 143 284 -3 -12 -15 -15 -18
Denmark 255 538 -4 -14 -17 -18 -23
Estonia 16 55 1 -54 -60 -60 -59
Finland 209 506 -2 -10 -12 -12 -16
France 2,297 5,244 -2 -13 -17 -17 -18
Germany 3,069 5,159 -2 -24 -28 -28 -35
Greece 191 279 0 -29 -33 -33 -34
Hungary 107 202 -1 -3 -4 -4 -5
Ireland 213 525 2 -10 -12 -12 -18
Italy 1,666 2,236 -2 -25 -29 -29 -33
Latvia 18 46 3 -60 -67 -67 -63
Lithuania 29 63 7 -2 -3 -3 -3
Luxembourg 45 139 -7 -16 -19 -20 -24
Malta 7 14 -2 -20 -24 -24 -31
Netherlands 694 1,640 -2 -8 -10 -10 -13
Poland 405 723 -1 -3 -3 -3 -4
Portugal 171 199 -1 -14 -17 -17 -21
Romania 101 153 0 -2 -2 -2 -3
Slovak Republic 82 168 0 -1 -2 -2 -2
Slovenia 37 76 -1 -20 -24 -24 -27
Spain 1,171 2,001 -3 -20 -24 -24 -28
Sweden 414 1,127 -5 -13 -16 -16 -22
United Kingdom 2,393 6,325 -6 -11 -14 -14 -19
EU28 14,586 29,778 -3 -16 -19 -19 -23
2013 
Reference 
(bill. US$)
Main 
scenario 
(bill. US$)
Main 
scenario 
(unskilled)
Labour Productivity
% change relative to the main scenario in 2060
Capital Savings
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Figure 4: EU total output projections
 
At country level (Table 2), regarding the six biggest economies Germany would have the largest 
GDP loss, 35%. Italy, Spain, UK and France would have a drop equal to 33%, 28%, 19% and 18% 
respectively, while Poland would have a relatively small 4% reduction. Belgium and Austria would 
have also a big GDP loss (20% and 35% respectively). Latvia and Estonia would see the highest 
GDP loss within the EU (63% and 59%). Some countries would have smaller GDP losses, like 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary. 
It is interesting to note that, as a rule of thumb, the model predicts a bit more than one 
percentage point less of GDP for each percentage point less of labour (Table 3). With an output 
elasticity of Labour equal to 0.7 (a standard assumption in this type of economic models), one unit 
less of Labour should produce approximately a loss of 0.7 units of output. However, the model also 
captures the effect on GDP due to the other three transmission mechanisms: a slower capital 
accumulation and the effects of less savings and lower productivity due to the ageing population; 
these additional mechanisms add a 30% to 40% to the overall impacts on GDP.  
Only for Estonia and Latvia, the percentage loss of GDP is lower than the percentage loss of Labor. 
This is due to the age distribution of their population with extra-EU background, which has the 
peak for the age range of 55 to 69 years. The “No migration” scenario implies a younger population 
which triggers positive effects on GDP via higher productivity growth and more savings that 
mitigate the negative effects on GDP due to the Labor input reduction.  
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Table 3: Labour and GDP in the "No Migration" case versus the "Man scenario" (% change) 
 
4.3 GDP per capita results 
Table 4 presents the output per capita changes for each country and the EU as a whole, with the 
contribution of each macroeconomic transmission mechanism (analysed with the different 
configurations of the model) to the overall loss of per capita output. The largest part of the loss is 
due to a slower accumulation of capital and to the drop in the productivity growth rate.  
The overall decrease and ageing of the EU population would cause the EU output per capita to be 
around 10% lower in 2060 in the "No migration" case than in the "Main scenario"; it would fall 
from around 57,000 US$ under the "Main scenario" to around 51,000 US$ in the "No migration" 
case including all the macroeconomic effects, i.e. "Productivity" case. Figure 5 shows their time 
evolution and the yearly losses.  
Austria -35 -32
Belgium -20 -17
Bulgaria -6 -7
Croatia -4 -4
Cyprus -20 -14
Czech Republic -18 -17
Denmark -23 -20
Estonia -59 -67
Finland -16 -13
France -18 -19
Germany -35 -32
Greece -34 -38
Hungary -5 -4
Ireland -18 -13
Italy -33 -34
Latvia -63 -73
Lithuania -3 -3
Luxembourg -24 -22
Malta -31 -28
Netherlands -13 -11
Poland -4 -4
Portugal -21 -20
Romania -3 -2
Slovak Republic -2 -2
Slovenia -27 -27
Spain -28 -27
Sweden -22 -18
United Kingdom -19 -16
EU28 -23 -21
Labour (% loss)GDP (% loss)
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Table 4: EU and country output per capita projections for 2060 under the "Main scenario", "Main scenario 
(unskilled)", "Labour", "Capital", "Savings", "Productivity" 
 
Austria 40,606 74,812 -5 -1 -7 -7 -15
Belgium 37,308 74,165 -7 -1 -4 -5 -9
Bulgaria 4,708 11,757 0 0 -1 -1 -2
Croatia 10,353 62,266 -1 0 -1 -1 -1
Cyprus 17,392 23,270 -2 0 -2 -2 -11
Czech Republic 13,636 27,505 -3 -2 -5 -5 -8
Denmark 45,531 79,695 -4 0 -4 -4 -10
Estonia 12,195 45,186 1 -6 -19 -19 -17
Finland 38,535 89,562 -2 -1 -3 -3 -8
France 35,011 69,428 -2 1 -3 -3 -5
Germany 38,114 63,820 -2 -2 -7 -7 -16
Greece 17,327 33,657 0 -4 -10 -11 -12
Hungary 10,792 22,150 -1 0 -1 -1 -2
Ireland 46,392 88,950 2 -1 -4 -4 -10
Italy 27,920 39,270 -2 -5 -10 -10 -15
Latvia 8,682 32,063 3 -6 -22 -22 -14
Lithuania 9,846 34,156 7 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 82,985 139,587 -7 -1 -6 -6 -11
Malta 16,329 27,300 -2 -5 -10 -10 -17
Netherlands 41,367 84,870 -2 0 -2 -3 -6
Poland 10,630 21,996 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2
Portugal 16,348 23,250 -1 -3 -6 -6 -11
Romania 5,043 9,746 0 0 0 0 -1
Slovak Republic 15,155 32,801 0 0 -1 -1 -1
Slovenia 17,933 38,232 -1 -4 -8 -9 -13
Spain 25,066 40,381 -3 -3 -7 -8 -13
Sweden 43,336 84,798 -5 0 -3 -4 -10
United Kingdom 37,440 79,720 -6 -1 -4 -4 -9
EU28 28,874 56,759 -3 -1 -5 -6 -10
2013 
Reference 
(bill. US$)
Main 
scenario 
(bill. 
% change relative to the main scenario in 2060
Main 
scenario 
Labour Capital Savings Productivity
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Figure 5: EU per capita output and relative loss projections 
 
The labour supply reduction (column 'Labour') would have an overall effect on the level of EU 
output per capita of around 1%. However, including the other macroeconomic effects does affect 
the level of output per capita significantly.  
The "Main scenario (unskilled)", where all migrants would have the secondary education level 
(rather than that of the population), would yield a level of output per capita higher than the one 
without migration (including the effects on capital accumulation, savings and productivity), a 
reduction of EU output per capita of 3.1% versus a reduction of 10%, respectively.  
For most of the countries, the fall in output per capita is larger or equal to 8% and for half of the 
EU countries, including countries like Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany and Sweden, could 
be larger or equal to 10%. 
Figure 6 plots the output per capita in 2060 as projected in the "Main scenario" (dark blue areas) 
and in the "No migration" case (light blue areas). The horizontal axis represent the percentage of 
the EU population and countries are ordered from low to higher GDP per capita (left to right). The 
graph shows that a "No migration" scenario where labour supply, savings and productivity are 
affected would produce a generalized decrease of the output per capita. Assuming that the output 
per capita is the same for all citizens of any country, on average around 90% of the EU population 
would be worse off. 
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5 Conclusions 
Europe has experienced an ageing of its population over the last few decades. According to the 
most recent Eurostat demographic projections, ageing is expected to continue and intensify. 
International migration flows could mitigate the ageing population, sustain economic growth, 
mainly boosting working age population, and could have a significant positive impact on the 
European long-term economic prospects. 
The present study has concluded that without migration by 2060 the EU would lose a fifth of the 
output that could be achieved with migration, with a 7 trillion US$ GDP loss by 2060. The 
cumulative output loss for the entire projection period would be 47 trillion US$, once discounted at 
a 3% rate. The long-term annual economic growth rate would fall from 1.5% to less than 1%. In 
terms of output per capita, the overall impact for the aggregate EU could be larger than 10%. 
Around 90% of the EU population could be worse off. The overall EU total and per capita output 
losses would potentially have major geopolitical consequences, jeopardising the EU economic 
relevance in the international arena. 
The results are preliminary and focus on the total and per capita output perspectives, offering a 
partial, although probably a very relevant view on the topic of migration and long term 
development. Nevertheless, some caveats are to be considered when interpreting the results. The 
distribution of the total stock of population with extra-EU background across countries and for each 
country across age groups is maintained fixed throughout the projections period.  
Other possible transmission mechanisms like how economic growth might affect migration, the age 
structure and the participation rates are not considered. 
This study does not account either for the impacts at sectoral level. Some sectors in some 
countries might experience a reduction of the income per worker, due to the increase of labour 
supply, so that some incumbent workers could be worse off. The linkage of MaGE with a 
multisectoral model might help shedding light on these aspects. Moreover, this analysis could be 
further improved with better assumptions and additional data on the country of origin of the 
migrants. In this respect the matrices on the origin-destination of the migration flows published by 
the UN could be used in combination with the Eurostat data, in order to a have a better 
measurement of the skilled/unskilled proportion of the population and a more precise analysis of 
the effects on capital-labour productivity. 
Due to the current set up of the model and to the characteristics of the input data used to modify 
the demographic assumptions, the present study does not take into account some other economic 
impacts of the migration phenomenon. For instance, key aspects to be considered relate to the 
fiscal impacts and also to the impacts on the social security and pension system. The analysis does 
not consider any cost due to the integration of the migrants, as well as it does not consider the 
benefits deriving from a more sustainable social security and pension system. The integration of 
the migrants is likely to have a short-run fiscal impact, due to increasing taxes and an increase in 
public education and social security costs. However, the effects could be positive in the long-run 
with successful integration (Melander et al., 2016). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Demographic scenarios construction details 
The two population scenarios used in this analysis are derived from the Eurostat population 
projections by sex and age, with and without migration (Eurostat 2017). In particular, the 
projections without migration do not consider both intra-EU and extra-EU migration at country 
level, therefore in order to construct a “No migration”scenario for each EU countries where only the 
population with extra-EU background is not included, further assumptions needed to be made.  
The first assumption is that the intra-EU migrants maintain in the country of destination the same 
fertility and mortality rates of their country of origin; under this assumption the sum across EU 
countries of the intra-EU migration stock is equal to zero and the difference between the overall EU 
population under the two scenarios is equal to the total stock of population with extra-EU 
background, i.e. non EU immigrants and their descendants.  
The overall stock of population with extra-EU background is allocated to each Member States 
according to the percentages reported in Table 5. In the absence of better data, these percentages 
are kept fixed throughout the projection period. We might foresee a certain degree of convergence 
of these percentages across countries which might give different results. However, we do not 
expect this convergence to give a very different picture and patterns of results. 
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Table 5: Shares by EU28 country of total extra-EU immigrant stock to EU28 
 female (%) male (%) 
Belgium 2.1 2.1 
Bulgaria 0.3 0.3 
Czech Republic 1.3 1.5 
Denmark 1.3 1.2 
Germany 23.2 25.2 
Estonia 0.8 0.8 
Ireland 0.6 0.6 
Greece 2.8 2.8 
Spain 11.9 11.1 
France 14.4 13.9 
Croatia 0.2 0.1 
Italy 16.3 16.2 
Cyprus 0.2 0.1 
Latvia 1.4 1.2 
Lithuania 0.1 0.1 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 
Hungary 0.3 0.4 
Malta 0.1 0.1 
Netherlands 2.0 1.9 
Austria 3.0 3.3 
Poland 0.7 0.9 
Portugal 1.4 1.2 
Romania 0.2 0.3 
Slovenia 0.3 0.6 
Slovak Republic 0.1 0.1 
Finland 0.6 0.7 
Sweden 2.2 2.5 
United Kingdom 12.0 10.7 
Once computed, the stock of population with extra-EU background of each country is allocated to 
18 age groups (0-4; 5-9; …; 80+ years old) according to the shares as provided by Eurostat 
(Eurostat 2017). Also these shares are maintained fixed thoughout the entire projection period. 
According to Eurostat statistics, the majority of the population with extra-EU background is 
comprised between 20 and 40 years of age. However, Estonia and Latvia represent an exception as 
for them the majority of population with extra-EU background is comprised in the range 55 to 69 
years of age. The stock of population with extra-EU background for each country and 18 age 
groups is subtracted from the country projections of the "Main scenario" thus giving the "No 
migration" projections at country level. 
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Annex 2. The MaGE model 
MaGE is an econometric long term growth model for the world economy, estimated with data from 
the World Bank and the United Nations (Fouré et al., 2013). The main equation of the model is a 
production function where Labour and Capital (which are combined to form a composite input) are 
imperfect substitutes for Energy. The production function also has two forms of technical change: 
one specifically for the productivity of Energy and the other one for the Capital-Labour composite. 
The Energy productivity variable is assumed to be exogenous and to follow a convergence process. 
Countries with higher initial Energy productivity levels grow more slowly (i.e. around 1 or 1.5% 
growth per year) than countries with lower initial levels, where productivity grows faster (i.e. 
between 2.5, 3% per year). 
The capital-labour productivity variable (from now on referred as productivity) is endogenous in 
the model and depends on the distance from the maximum of productivity level (kept exogenous), 
the age structure of the overall population and the proportion of unskilled labour in the population. 
Labour supply to production is exogenous. For this analysis, the labour assumptions of MaGE for 
the EU countries (corresponding usually to those of the UN World Population Prospects), are 
replaced by the Eurostat population scenarios (Eurostat, 2017). Both the male and female 
participation rates to the labour market are exogenous in these scenarios; for males they are taken 
from the official projections of the International Labour Organization (ILO) while for females they 
are projected on the basis of an econometric relation between female participation rates and 
education. The education levels for each country, on which the proportion of skilled vs. unskilled 
labour depends on, are projected as a pure convergence process following a logistic function (Fouré 
et al., 2013). 
Another relevant part of the model is the set of equations relating the savings rates to the age 
structure of the population, according to the Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis, and the Feldstein-
Horioka equation that associates domestic savings with domestic investments (Modigliani and 
Brumberg, 1954; Deaton, 2005; Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). MaGE departs from the extreme 
assumptions of a financially closed economy or of perfect capital international mobility and 
assumes that domestic savings only finance a part of the domestic investments, depending on the 
degrees of openness of the economy. Investments eventually contribute to the capital stock 
formation of the economy, represented in the model with a recursive equation where the capital 
stock in the current year depends on the capital stock of the previous year, minus the stock that 
has depreciated plus the investments. 
The demographic projections are therefore a fundamental input to the model as the labour 
availability to production, the savings rates of the economy and productivity depend on the overall 
population, its age structure and the proportion of unskilled labour in the economy.  
The most relevant parameters of the model are: 
1. the output elasticity of the labour input; 
2. the relationship between productivity and both the age structure and the proportion of un-
skilled workers; 
3. the relationship between the saving rates and the age structure; 
4. the degree of openness of the economy; 
5. the rate of depreciation of the capital stock. 
The output elasticity to Labour is assumed to be 0.7, which means that if labour supply decreases 
by 10% total output decreases by 7%. In the model, Labour is combined with Capital in a way that 
assumes perfect substitution between the two factor inputs, as well as constant return to scale, 
which implies that the output elasticity for Capital is equal to 0.3.  
The savings rate depends on the level of the income per capita and the age structure, the latter is 
modelled with a non-linear mathematical formulation.  
The degree of financial openness (represented by the elasticity between savings and investment 
rates) is econometrically estimated to be equal to 0.19 if the country is not a member of the OECD 
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or 0.52 otherwise. Therefore, EU countries being part of the OECD are relatively more dependent 
on domestic savings. 
The last relevant parameter is the depreciation rate for the capital stock, which is equal to 0.06 for 
all countries. Each year the capital stock loses 6% of its value, a fraction that is replaced by the 
investments that are calculated as a share of the available national income. 
The next equations represent the core functioning of the model. The following text explains each of 
them in turn. 
𝒀𝒕 = {[𝑨𝒕𝑲𝒕
𝜶𝑳𝒕
𝟏−𝜶]𝝆 + [𝑩𝒕𝑬𝒕]
𝝆}𝟏/𝝆 (1) 
𝑨𝒕 = 𝒆
𝒓𝒕 𝑨𝒕−𝟏 (2) 
𝒓𝒕 = 𝐥𝐧 (
𝑨𝒕
𝑨𝒕−𝟏
) =  𝝎𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 (
𝑨𝒕−𝟏
𝒎𝒂𝒙𝑨𝒕−𝟏
) + ∑ 𝝋
𝒌
𝒅𝒌,𝒕
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒕 (3) 
𝑲𝒕 = (𝟏 − 𝜹)𝑲𝒕−𝟏 + 𝑰𝒕−𝟏 (4) 
∆ (
𝑰
𝒀
)
𝒕
= 𝝎𝟐 + 𝜽 {(
𝑰
𝒀
)
𝒕−𝟏
− 𝜷𝟑 − 𝜷𝟒 (
𝑺
𝒀
)
𝒕−𝟏
} + 𝜷𝟓∆ (
𝑺
𝒀
)
𝒕
 (5) 
(
𝑺
𝒀
)
𝒕
= 𝝎𝟑 + 𝜷𝟔 𝐥𝐧 (
𝒚
𝒖𝒔,𝒕−𝟏
𝒚
𝒕−𝟏
) + 𝜷
𝟕
𝒈
𝒕−𝟏
+ ∑ 𝝀𝒌𝒅𝒌
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏 𝒈𝒕−𝟏 (6) 
𝒈
𝒕
= ∆𝒀𝒕 − ∆𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒕 (7) 
The core of the model is a two-level Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) with two different 
types of augmenting technical progress (related to capital-labour and energy); it is used in other 
similar growth models as an improvement relative to the simpler Cobb-Douglas function 
representation (Van der Werf, 2008; Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato, 2007). In the first level, 
output (GDP, represented by 𝒀𝒕) is obtained from a composite of capital (𝐾𝑡 ) and labour (𝐿𝑡 ) used 
in combination with energy (𝐸𝑡). The second level is a Cobb-Douglas production function of capital 
and labour. Equation 1 represents the overall production function including the three factors of 
production and the two forms of technical change. Variable 𝐴𝑡, i.e. capital-labour productivity, 
grows annually at a rate equal to 𝑟𝑡 (Equation  2), which is explained in the present analysis by 
equation  3. The growth rate of capital-labour productivity depends on the distance to the frontier 
𝐴𝑡−1
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑡−1
, on the age structure of the population 𝑑𝑘,𝑡 and the proportion of unskilled population 
𝒖𝒏𝒔𝒌𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒅𝒕 calculated as the part of the population holding up to a diploma of secondary education. 
In order to have a parsimonious representation of the age structure of the population, we use the 
method proposed by (Fair and Dominguez, 1987); the 𝑑𝑘,𝑡 with k equal to 3 are the parameters of a 
polynomial representation of the age of the population as proposed in the cited paper. Equation  4 
refers to the accumulation of capital stock that depends on the depreciation rate 𝛿, which is 
assumed constant over time, and the previous period investments 𝐼𝑡−1. Investments share growth 
rates ∆ (
𝐼
𝑌
)
𝑡
 are explained in equation 5 as a function of the saving rate (
𝑆
𝑌
)
𝑡−1
 with an Error 
Correction Model specification (ECM, Engle and Granger, 1987). The saving rate is projected with 
equation  6 as a function of  
𝑦𝑢𝑠,𝑡−1
𝑦𝑡−1
 , i.e. country GDP per capita relative to the US level, 𝑔
𝑡−1
 growth 
of GDP per capita, 𝑑𝑘,𝑡 age structure of the population using the same variables as in equation  3 
and the interaction between these last two covariates. The last equation (number 7) refers to the 
variable 𝑔
𝑡
 growth of GDP per capita. 
In order to account for the effects of migration on productivity growth rates, the equation of MaGE 
for this variable has been replaced with an equation that includes as explanatory variables the 
demographic structure, the distance to the maximum productivity level and the proportion of 
unskilled population. We present further details for this part of the model in Annex 3. 
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Annex 3. Capital-labour productivity equation 
The equation for capital-labour productivity has been replaced in this version of the MaGE model 
with one that accounts for the effects of the age structure of the population. This modification 
intends to capture the possible association between the age structure of the population and 
productivity.  
For instance, Feyrer (2007) looks at the correlation between the age structure of the population 
and different measures of productivity. He found that the age cohort comprised between 40 and 49 
is the one with the largest positive impact on productivity. Feyrer uses these results to explain the 
productivity boom occurred in the US during the seventies and found that 2% of that productivity 
increase was explained by the entry of the baby boom into the workforce (Feyrer, 2007). More 
recently, Aiyar et al. and Liu and Westelius from the IMF, explored the same research topic for 
Europe and Japan respectively (Aiyar et al., 2016; Liu and Westelius 2017). Aiyar et al. found that 
in Europe, workforce ageing has negative impacts mainly via the effect on Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth. They also estimated that the expected workforce ageing could reduce the TFP 
growth by an average of 0.2 percentage points every year for the next two decades. Westelius et 
al. conducted a similar analysis for Japan and also found that workforce ageing slows down TFP 
productivity growth. In particular they found that in Japan, the shift in the age distribution 
occurred between 1990 and 2005 reduced annual TFP growth by 0.7-0.9 percent (e.g. if TPF was 
growing at 1%, it would grow at 0.1 to 0.3%).  
In this section we present and discuss the result of the estimation of the capital-labour productivity 
equation (Eq.3). As dependent variable we use the growth rate of capital-labour productivity, the 
latter calculated as a Solow residual from the CES production function by assuming firms profit 
maximization. We then calculate the growth rates of the Solow residual as the first difference in 
logarithms. The covariates of Eq. 3 are the first lag of the dependent variable, the distance of a 
country’s Solow residual from the average of the Solow residuals of the four best performing 
countries, which is assumed as the technological frontier, the proportion of unskilled population 
over total population and a measure of the age distribution of the population that uses a 
polynomial representation as explained in (Fair and Dominguez, 1987).  
The data used for the estimation are taken from the UN population statistics for the age structure 
of the population, e.g. medium variant of World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, and from 
Barro and Lee for education and skilled unskilled population (Barro and Lee, 2013; United Nations 
et al., 2015). The proportion of unskilled population corresponds to the part of the population that 
has attained secondary education or less; the data for of education attainment are from the Barro 
and Lee dataset (2010, revision 1.2) and are available for five year intervals from 1950 to 2010. 
For this analysis the education data have been linearly interpolated to have yearly data in order to 
match the rest of the dataset.  
The estimated model also includes time and country dummies to account for specific year shocks 
or permanent differences between countries respectively. The new equation has been estimated 
using a panel data for the EU countries from 1960 to 2010.  
Table 6 presents econometric results of the estimation of the parameters of the models. The 
parameters of the equations for the Feldstein-Horioka model, i.e. the relationship between 
investments and savings, and the equation for the saving rates were already part of MaGE, while 
the parameters for the capital-labour productivity equation have been estimated for this specific 
analysis. 
We estimated the model using a sample EU countries plus the US. The model specification does not 
show a good statistical fit for a larger sample with a global geographical coverage, meaning that 
this model specification is not able to explain TFP growth dynamics for a very heterogeneous 
sample. However, when the sample is restricted to the OECD countries only or to EU and USA 
together, the fit improves substantially. The estimated parameters have all the expected sign. The 
reported standard errors are robust to both heteroscedasticity and panel serial-correlation. The 
response to an increase of the proportion of unskilled population is negative (Di Maria and 
Lazarova, 2012), while the parameters for the age structure of the population are consistent with 
the findings in (Feyrer, 2007), young population in age cohort 30-35 and old population, i.e. above 
55 years old, are the those most contributing to productivity growth.  
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Table 6: Econometric results 
 
  
1 2 3
Feld. Horioka Savings Capital-Labour prod.
β5 (growth sav. rate) 0.644***
(-0.024)
θ (ecm) -0.196***
(-0.017)
ω2 -0.001**
(-0.001)
β6 (GDPcap. rel. US) 0.118***
(-0.022)
β7 (GDPcap. growth) 0.857***
(-0.201)
λ1 (dem1 x GDPcap. growth) -9.955***
(-2.954)
λ2 (dem2 x GDPcap. growth) 1.856***
(-0.478)
λ3 (dem3 x GDPcap. growth) -0.088***
(-0.021)
ω3 0.141***
(-0.006)
LDV1 (lagged dep. var. 1
st
) 0.370***
(-0.0381)
LDV2 (lagged dep. var. 2
nd
) 0.0745**
(-0.0266)
β1 (distance) -0.0819***
(-0.00842)
β2 (unskilled) -0.0104*
(-0.00494)
φ1 (dem1) 0.293**
(-0.0983)
φ2 (dem2) -0.0377*
(-0.0151)
φ3 (dem3) 0.00137*
(-0.000647)
ω1 -0.00521
 (-0.0161)
R-sq 0.418 0.089 0.5146 (Adj.)
N 1302 1097 1015
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p <0.001
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Table 7: projected participation rates for male and female population aged from 15 to 64 for each EU country 
 2013 2020 2040 2060 
 female male female male female male female male 
Austria 65 77 66 76 67 75 67 73 
Belgium 58 69 59 69 61 70 62 69 
Bulgaria 57 69 57 70 54 67 55 69 
Cyorus 63 77 64 78 61 77 64 77 
Czech Republic 57 73 59 73 55 68 57 69 
Germany 68 78 68 76 70 76 71 76 
Denmark 70 78 71 78 71 78 71 78 
Spain 60 78 60 76 59 72 66 77 
Estonia 66 76 65 75 64 72 65 74 
Finland 67 72 67 72 69 74 68 73 
France 61 70 61 69 64 70 67 71 
Great Britain 65 77 66 78 67 77 68 76 
Greece 51 73 50 71 47 67 50 69 
Croatia 55 67 55 65 55 63 56 62 
Hungary 50 64 51 64 49 61 50 61 
Ireland 61 77 61 75 61 74 66 77 
Italy 48 69 48 68 48 64 50 64 
Lithuania 60 68 60 67 54 62 56 64 
Luxemburg 58 70 59 69 62 69 62 66 
Latvia 66 78 67 78 65 77 67 80 
Malta 36 72 38 73 39 71 40 69 
Nederland 70 80 72 80 75 81 77 81 
Poland 53 66 53 65 49 61 50 61 
Portugal 65 75 64 72 63 70 65 71 
Romania 50 64 48 62 44 56 44 56 
Slovakia 58 74 58 73 56 69 56 68 
Slovenia 62 71 60 69 58 67 62 70 
Sweden 72 78 74 79 74 79 75 80 
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